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 INTRODUCTION 
Neoliberalism is principally a political project of embedding market values and 
structures not just within economic, but also within social and political life. Its 
objective is a reshaping of power relations. However, within the neoliberal camp there 
have always been differences over how far this process should extend and by what 
means it should be achieved. Neoliberalism is a dynamic and at times problematic 
amalgamation of interests and ideologies. Indeed, the emergence of the Post-
Washington Consensus (PWC) with its emphasis on market supportive institutions is 
as much reflective of these internal frictions as it is of the overall unifying aspects of 
the neoliberal reform agenda. The advent of the ‘war on terror’ and associated US 
foreign policy towards unilateralism adds another dimension to internal neoliberal 
debates about the most appropriate and effective ways to internationally embed 
market power and values (see Rodan and Hewison 2004).  
Thematic to past and present differences among neoliberals is a complex 
tension between the various understandings of the relationship between economic and 
political liberalism, including differing degrees of understanding and commitment to 
the latter. This tension is not always evident. In part this is because within the 
neoliberal camp the detail and sophistication in the different articulations of the 
relationship between economic and political liberalism vary, as does the consistency 
with which these views are prosecuted. It is also because the historical context of 
neoliberalism mediates the significance of any internal differences.  
This paper represents an attempt to analyse the nature and significance of 
different neoliberal positions on the relationship between economic and political 
liberalism by examining the meaning and purpose of transparency reform among 
neoliberals. It also assesses the implications of these transparency reforms for political 
regimes.  
The concept of transparency has been thematic to neoliberal reform 
prescriptions in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, featuring heavily 
among PWC ideas about the building of institutions to support sustainable market 
systems in that region and elsewhere. It has even enjoyed currency among those 
within the neoliberal camp that have been less than wholehearted enthusiasts of the 
overall agenda of the PWC. A central interest of this essay therefore is to establish 
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political implications in that it entails curbs on the discretionary powers over 
information availability (Florini 2000). But how does this relate to political liberalism 
and the distribution of power? Whose interests are being advanced through the 
different forms of transparency prescribed by neoliberals? And what does neoliberal 
transparency reform mean for authoritarian political regimes? 
In the discussion to follow, it will be argued that within the neoliberal camp 
there are some significant differences in both the extent and forms of transparency 
being advocated and/or actively supported. In particular, there is a distinction to be 
drawn between those that limit their transparency advocacy to the provision of 
information with an immediate instrumental relationship to the market and to the 
enforcement of pro-market regulations, and those that embrace a more expansive 
notion of openness relating various liberal civil society and political institutions to the 
market.   
Importantly, though, both conceptions of transparency are rooted in a logic of 
market functionality. Within this framework, transparency’s fundamental purpose is 
that of rendering greater discipline and accountability of policymakers and actors to 
the market. Forms of transparency that might increase the market’s accountability to 
policymakers and citizens have been either marginal to, or completely outside, this 
framework and have made limited progress in developing countries affected by 
financial crises. Yet this may well be the most significant feature of the neoliberal 
transparency drive: its potential to depoliticise an inherently political process that 
protects and advances certain interests to the exclusion of others. Indeed, despite 
popular association of transparency with ideals of democracy, neoliberal concepts of 
transparency loom as an alternative to these. Moreover, it is principally Weberian and 
technocratic rationalism that these concepts promote and they do not pose a universal 
threat to authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, more sophisticated such regimes may 
be able to harness neoliberal concepts of transparency to their legitimation and 
reproduction. 
  
  2CONSENSUS NOT WITHOUT TENSIONS 
In an address to the World Bank in January 2004, the originator of the term 
‘Washington consensus’, John Williamson (2004), critically reflected on the way in 
which others have used the term. In particular, he was at pains to emphasise that he 
never meant in the 1989 statement to imply a neoliberal conspiracy from international 
financial institutions (IFIs) based in Washington. He also lamented that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, he was overly optimistic in thinking the assortment of pro-market 
policies – including trade liberalisation, macroeconomic discipline and privatisation – 
prescribed for developing countries at that time really did enjoy as much support 
among the IFIs as he thought. Finally, Williamson dispels as myth the idea that in 
recent times there has been a sharp shift in Washington away from a minimal state 
approach to development in favour of one that champions and facilitates a wide range 
of institutions supportive of markets – the so-called PWC. He points out that his 1989 
statement had been augmented by suggested institutional reforms along this path. As 
if to belie his own thesis, though, in the same 2004 speech Williamson (2004: 14) 
delivered a stinging critique of former World Bank vice-president and principal 
articulator of the PWC, Joseph Stiglitz, precisely for trying to forge ahead with 
institutional reforms to support market systems. He describes Stiglitz as ‘sadly naïve 
in imagining that the world is on the road to a new consensus in incorporating 
concerns over equity, sustainability, and democracy as well as growth’.  
  Williamson’s 2004 speech raises a number of questions that need to be 
sorted out as a prelude to evaluating the meaning and significance of transparency 
within the contemporary neoliberal reform agenda. What are the definitive 
characteristics of neoliberalism? Has it undergone a fundamental transition in the 
passage from the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ to a PWC or has this been 
exaggerated? And just how solid is the ‘consensus’ among neoliberals over the way 
forward? 
  The first point to make is that Williamson’s own grasp of what 
constitutes the Washington Consensus never did suffice as an encapsulation of 
neoliberalism per se. His list of the Washington Consensus’s ‘ten commandments’ 
has been routinely cited in the academic literature. However, useful as it was for 
distilling concrete policies associated with neoliberalism at the time, only with 
additional characterisation or conceptualisation could neoliberalism be adequately 
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fixed policy prescriptions. Rather, neoliberalism seeks to establish a political order 
that maximises support for, and privileges to, market relationships and values. This 
necessarily involves attempts to insulate interests tied to such an order from effective 
contestation and challenge. Viewed in this way, neoliberalism is a project that permits 
or even requires dynamic policy agendas and strategies for its realisation, even if 
some policy ideals such as economic liberalisation remain constant.  
Arguably, what is most important about the neoliberal revolution that has 
swept advanced capitalist countries to varying degrees in recent decades is not simply 
the extent of liberal economic reform, crucial as this is. It is that it has been 
accompanied by the institutionalisation of market ideology to a point where effective 
political challenges to the power of capital have been significantly diminished (King 
and Kendall 2004, Brodie 2004). This should be borne in mind when analysing the 
form and significance of neoliberal reform agendas for globalisation affecting 
developing and recently developed countries. So too should Cerny’s (2004: 7) 
observation about the pervasiveness of the neoliberal idea that the market is the ‘core 
institution of modern – capitalist – societies and that both domestic and international 
politics are (and should be) increasingly concerned with making markets work well’. 
Attempts to encapsulate the essential elements of the Washington Consensus 
development policy orthodoxy of the late 1980s and most of the 1990s emphasise the 
resurrection of longstanding economic liberal notions of free trade, minimal states and 
the general superiority of markets for allocating resources. To quote Soederberg 
(2004: 281), the Washington Consensus ‘was premised on the steadfast belief that 
political and social problems should be solved through market-based mechanisms and 
the rule of law as opposed to state interventionism’.  Critical analysts of neoliberalism 
had pointed out well before the Asian and other recent financial crises that there was a 
major disjuncture between this set of beliefs and the objective reality of neoliberalism. 
In particular, far from the global expansion of market-based systems entailing the 
dismantling of state power, it had been accompanied by a combination of more 
coercive state powers to politically protect economic reforms from popular 
challenges, and a new regulatory state that was increasingly concealing and insulating 
policy choices from the political process altogether (Vogel 1996, Jayasuriya 2000). 
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establishment that proved decisive. The socially iniquitous and politically divisive 
effects of the Washington Consensus agenda had given liberal economists with a less 
starry-eyed belief in the invisible hand of the free market even more cause for concern 
and theoretical rethinking.  
What then distinguishes the PWC from the previous orthodoxy? The PWC 
rejects the Washington Consensus assumption that markets are naturally and 
universally efficient. Instead it assumes that market failure is not uncommon. 
Consequently, some degree of state intervention is necessary to redress this to ensure 
the most effectively functioning market system. This position alone is not entirely 
new to liberal economic theory but in the contemporary counter to the Washington 
Consensus it is supplemented by a related assumption, namely that a host of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions are crucial to market efficiency and 
sustainability. These institutions are considered vital in transmitting information 
pertinent to investment decisions and reducing transaction costs in the market place. 
In this view, institutions are needed to regulate the market for its own good.  
The collapse of financial markets in Asia and elsewhere in the late 1990s 
created the opportunity to push this argument home in policy circles. In the drive for 
improved regulation, the PWC has involved a broad agenda of governance reforms to 
achieve greater institutional convergence between developed and developing markets. 
This represents a new phase in the pressure towards a regulatory state, in which there 
is, according to Jayasuriya (2001: 6), ‘a clear shift towards a view of markets as 
political and legal creations’. However, this shift actually involves structures and 
ideology insulating policy choices from political contestation and depicting these as 
technical matters of governance (Harriss 2002).  
There are many dimensions to this process,
1 but they include the call for 
institutions to deliver improved transparency (Camdessus 1998a, 1998b, World Bank 
1997), the details of which will be outlined below. Additionally, though, the PWC 
case for institution building extends to a broad set of social relations that function to 
reduce economic transactions costs, including by correcting information asymmetries. 
They include the so-called social capital that underscores the cohesiveness and 
harmony of societies; the assorted networks of support and meaning essential to 
sustainable market systems (Fine, Lapavitsas & Pincus 2001a: xvii). The renewed 
  5attention to the problem of poverty by the World Bank was related to this theoretical 
position of the PWC and also reflected a growing concern among liberal economists 
about the unpopularity of, and contention over, neoliberalism in developing countries 
(Soederberg 2004: 284; 2002: 285-7).  
As a number of analysts have pointed out, though, these important distinctions 
have not meant the retreat of neoliberalism so much as a new chapter in its 
development. Cammack (2004) argues that this direction represents a transition from 
a ‘shallow neoliberalism’ emphasising a minimal state to a ‘deep neoliberalism’ 
attempting to shape social relations and institutions to make markets more 
competitive. According to Cammack (2004: 190), the PWC has meant the substitution 
of ‘economic shock therapy’ by the IFIs with ‘institutional shock therapy’. Cerny 
(2004) and Brodie (2004) also refer to an ‘embedding’ of neoliberalism through new 
forms of governance that penetrate into the social and political realms, while 
Jayasuriya (1999) contends that PWC programmes of social capital and empowerment 
foster political structures and ideologies that are intended to legitimate and more 
securely entrench market relations.  
Crucially for this essay, though, the replacement of the Washington Consensus 
with this new PWC orthodoxy does not mean the end of friction between different 
elements of the neoliberal camp. The departure of Stiglitz from the World Bank in the 
face of a backlash from within and beyond the Bank is but one of the more 
conspicuous demonstrations of this (Wade 2001,  Stiglitz 2002). More broadly, 
elements of the US neoliberal establishment, and economic libertarian and other right-
wing groups committed to the pre-eminence of market values, have reservations about 
key aspects of the PWC. Some have focussed their campaigns on the IFIs themselves.  
For example, former and current US Treasury secretaries Larry Summers and 
Paul O’Neil have condemned the World Bank’s initiatives on ‘empowerment’ urging 
a return to project focus on raising productivity and income levels (Bøås and McNeill 
2003). Free marketeers in the Friedrich von Hayek tradition, such as the Cato Institute 
and the Heritage Foundation, have also portrayed the World Bank and the IMF as part 
of the development problem. They have echoed some criticisms of IFIs in the US 
Congress International Financial Advisory Commission (IFIAC), headed by Allen 
Meltzer of the Carnegie Mellon University. The Meltzer Report condemned the IMF 
for rescuing governments through crisis loans instead of allowing markets to exert 
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calls for internal IFI reform, arguing that institution-building priority should be 
concentrated on fostering economic freedom and the associated institutions of rule of 
law and private property. Indeed, they have been strong supporters of the Bush 
Administration’s new US$5 billion Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
development assistance programme initiative that offers a potential means of 
bypassing the IFIs to more directly promote such an agenda (Schaffer and Pasicolan 
2003, Eiras 2003, Radelet 2004). Importantly, even the most extreme economic 
libertarians now understand that Locke’s ‘nightwatchman state’ is inadequate for the 
task of neoliberal globalisation. 
 
LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
These internal neoliberal tensions are rooted in longstanding differences over the 
understanding of liberalism and its relationship to market development. For liberals, 
ideals of freedom and liberty are paramount. The attraction to democracy among 
liberals has thus always been qualified and uneven. The ‘limited democracy’ preferred 
by liberals stems from concern that the sorts of freedoms and liberties they value 
could be threatened by anything more than this. But what are the freedoms and 
liberties they value?  
For liberals influenced by Hayek and Milton Friedman, the concepts of 
‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are equated almost exclusively with the economic freedom 
and economic liberty of individuals through private property rights. Indeed, personal 
liberty is often either indistinguishable from economic liberty or, in effect, reduced to 
it. It is a position championed through an array of think tanks and organisations, not 
least via various indices of economic freedom that rank countries and are widely 
reported in the international media. The most high-profile of these is the annual Index 
of Economic Freedom jointly published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall 
Street Journal, but the Economic Freedom of the World index by the Cato Institute in 
conjunction with the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute and a further 50 organisations 
world-wide is also heavily cited. There is no mistaking the political priority accorded 
to the protection of private property rights in these indices. The Economic Freedom of 
the World: 2004 Annual Report, for example, declares that: ‘Protection of persons and 
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civil society. Indeed, it is the most important function of government’ (Gwartney and 
Lawson 2004: 6). The apprehension of the Cato Institute’s vice-president James Dorn 
about the implications of democracy was also candidly reflected on in his 
observations about the latest report: 
 
When Hong Kong does achieve democracy, that political watershed could be 
a curse as well as a blessing. It would be a curse if it allowed voters to use 
the force of legislation to plunder private property by redistributing it to 
special interest groups in the name of ‘social justice’. The expansion of the 
welfare-regulatory state would endanger both economic and personal 
freedom in Hong Kong. 
 
But it is also the primacy of private property rights that can lead economic liberals to 
rally in support of democracy in certain circumstances, although the precise form of 
democracy is not always clear. Thus, in a January 2004 press release announcing that 
Hong Kong was for the 10
th year in succession ranked at the top of the Index of 
Economic Freedom, The Wall Street Journal stated: 
The Index, however, does not measure political freedom. If it did, Hong 
Kong’s score would have taken a plunge this week on the news that Beijing 
has decided to slow the pace of democratic reform in Hong Kong and 
perhaps abandon it altogether. 
 
The press release went on to assert that one of the lessons the Index had demonstrated 
over the years was that ‘economic and political liberty go hand in hand’ (The Wall 
Street Journal 2004). However, the two countries that have dominated the top 
positions in this Index have been Hong Kong and Singapore. There has been no 
consistent interest in the absence of democracy in these countries from either the 
Heritage Foundation or The Wall Street Journal. On the contrary, secure property 
rights has been a recurring explanatory variable in distinguishing these two countries 
from the many languishing developing countries lower down the rankings.
2  
  The repeatedly high ranking of Singapore in these indices is especially 
interesting and revealing. First, despite a very open trading system, the domestic 
economy is subject to considerable direct and indirect economic state involvement. 
Many of these ‘distortions’ have helped to boost the profitability of international 
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if this is nevertheless thought to constitute ‘economic liberty’ because private property 
rights are generally secure, what sort of ‘political liberty’ accompanies it? In 
Singapore, civil society is systematically suppressed, opposition political parties are 
subject to a vast array of constraints in their attempts to compete for power, the media 
are amongst the most controlled in the world, and the courts have played a pivotal role 
in the political persecution of government critics and opponents (Rodan 1996, 
Lydgate 2003). Widely depicted as a paternalistic or ‘nanny’ state for the extensive 
social and political engineering limiting the scope for individual choice and 
responsibility (Tremewan 1994), on the surface Singapore would appear to be 
antithetical to any form of liberalism. Evidently, however, the attraction for 
neoliberals lies precisely in the fact that many of the features of the state and regime 
contribute to the access, profitability and security of international capital.
3
  Given that Hayek’s ideas have been the inspiration for so many 
neoliberals designing and promoting these economic freedom rankings, what did he 
have to say about the relationship between political regimes and liberalism? Hayek’s 
observations about life in Chile under the brutal regime of General Pinochet are 
significant on this. In a letter to The Times (London) on the 3
rd of August 1978, he 
declared: ‘I have not been able to find a single person even in much maligned Chile 
who did not agree that personal freedom was much greater under Pinochet than it had 
been under Allende’ (quoted in Arblaster 1984: 342). He also claimed that ‘there have 
of course been many instances of authoritarian governments under which personal 
liberty was safer than under many democracies’ (quoted in Arblaster 1984: 342). It 
was Hayek (1978: 143) too that drew a distinction between totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism to contend that ‘it is at least conceivable that an authoritarian 
government might act on liberal principles’. Clearly, the scope for conflation of 
economic liberty – or the sanctity of private property relations and the interests of 
those benefiting from them – with political and personal liberty is very high among 
some neoliberals. Moreover, democracy – even ‘limited democracy’ – is by no means 
an intrinsically attractive proposition for them. Indeed, where it threatens the security 
of ‘economic freedom’, alternative political regimes may be more appealing. 
The point is, as we will see below, that the attraction of the concept and 
institution of transparency for these neoliberals lies not in its utility for democracy but 
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neoliberals whose institution-building agenda extends to various forms of political 
transparency and to the ‘empowerment’ and ‘voice’ of diverse social groups and 
interests? 
Also within the neoliberal camp, there are conceptions of ‘liberty’ and 
‘freedom’ within which open political markets are deemed universally necessary to 
ensure open economic markets. Emphasis is thus placed on the role of political 
regulation and accountability in creating the conditions for effective and sustainable 
market systems. Political freedoms – including democracy – become important and 
routine ingredients in protecting private property rights and underscoring efficient 
market systems. However, the conception of democracy here is often procedural 
rather than substantive, with an emphasis on institutions that enforce accountability 
and restraint in the exercise of political and bureaucratic power. This is consistent 
with the general liberal preference for ‘limited democracy’, but it involves a much 
more developed notion of the economic utility of social and political institutions. 
Indeed, for some neoliberals, this extends to notions of civil society and informal 
political participation. Again, though, this has an underlying market rationale: shoring 
up the political legitimacy of market systems and containing political conflict that 
could be injurious to the embedding of market systems. This grounding of ideas about 
political participation and democracy in the rationale of market functionality is crucial 
in distinguishing this as a neoliberal framework, since it elevates and champions the 
values of the market ahead of values of political representation per se.   
This category embraces a complex variety of liberal positions with a range of 
intellectual and philosophical roots. Influences include the ideas of John Stuart Mill 
who, in On Liberty, placed a great deal more importance on articulating the 
relationship between political freedom and economic freedom than classical economic 
liberals. The importance he attached to freedom of speech and political expression 
was based on utilitarianism and positivism. Only through open debate could truth be 
identified, reasoned Mill. Stifling opinion could be stifling truths and human progress 
(Arblaster 1984: 61). The ideas of Maddison as they relate to the importance of 
informed citizens in checking abuses of political power are also in evidence (see 
Stiglitz 1999). The influence of de Tocqueville’s notion that freedom requires active 
participation in public political life and his emphasis on the role of associations and 
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Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) on the same themes.  
Importantly, de Tocqueville and Putnam both employ very generous 
understandings of civil society, which also emphasise social and economic 
functionality. Many of the social and civic organisations that they deem to be part of 
civil society would not pass the more rigorous criteria adopted by other theorists. In 
particular, some theorists require that collective action should be both genuinely 
independent of the state and be political in nature (Ehrenberg 1999, Bernhard 1993). 
This definition disqualifies various forms of civic associations and organisations that 
are brought into structures of political co-option with the state. Such a distinction is 
important because social organisation and civic society is not at all an anathema to 
authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, they are often harnessed to their reproduction 
(Gill 2000). Certainly in Singapore the regime has proved adept at promoting and co-
opting social organisations as a central part of its strategies of suppressing political 
contestation (Rodan 1996). 
World Bank (2000, 2002) publications have been pivotal in expounding these 
ideas on political liberalism and their market relevance. However, elements of them 
can also be found within aid agencies and various national and international non-
governmental-organisations (see USAID 2004, DFID 2003).   
While agreed on the meaning and value of economic liberalism, neoliberals 
vary in their understanding of what constitutes political liberalism and what role it 
plays in embedding economic liberalism and its attendant values.  Thus, while there 
may be a broad consensus among neoliberals on the need for institution building, 
there are significant differences over the scope and nature of this exercise. But how 
then does this relate to the specific matter of building institutions of transparency? 
 
INFORMATION AND MARKET IMPERFECTION 
In the PWC argument about the need for institutional responses to market failures, the 
establishment of institutions to rectify information imperfections assumes a central 
place. Thus, the World Bank’s 1998/99 World Development Report, Knowledge for 
Development, outlined in some detail the features of the new information-theoretic 
approach that lay behind prescriptions for increased transparency and information 
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of knowledge: knowledge about technology; and knowledge pertaining to attributes, 
for instance the credit worthiness of a firm. Unequal knowledge across and within 
countries – ‘knowledge gaps’ – and problems of incomplete knowledge of attributes – 
‘informational problems’ – were thwarting development, according to the Bank. The 
former has until recently not been advanced with anything like the same degree of 
programmatic backing as the latter within the IFIs, nor does it enjoy comparable 
support across the different elements of the neoliberal community. But there are also 
some important differences of emphasis among neoliberals on the relative importance 
of different information problems and, consequently, the reforms needed to redress 
such problems. 
The problem of ‘knowledge gaps’ led the Bank to call for a balance between 
the protection of intellectual property rights on the one hand, with efforts by 
developing country governments to ‘develop the technological competence to search 
for appropriate technologies to select, absorb and adapt imported technology’ on the 
other (World Bank 1998: 8). The Bank was principally making a case for 
governments investing in research-related social and physical infrastructure in 
developing countries. However, more recently Stiglitz (2003: 5) has shifted critical 
attention to the way that property rights act as ‘a temporary monopoly over a certain 
idea’ and often ‘involve the enclosure of the commons’ to the serious detriment of 
developing countries. Not surprisingly, these ideas have not been taken up with any 
enthusiasm by neoliberals in general. Libertarian ideas of economic freedom and their 
enshrinement in private property law don’t sit comfortably with Stiglitz’s observation. 
Since Stiglitz’s departure from the World Bank, many of his ideas have taken a much 
more social democratic direction. 
By contrast, the ‘informational problems’ referred to by the World Bank have 
been the focus of considerable rhetorical and programmatic efforts by IFIs and 
neoliberal forces in general. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the 
understanding of ‘informational problems’ and the solutions to them to be found 
among these forces. In particular, some neoliberals have expressed a broader 
conception of the link between information and the market than others, with ideas 
about the need to invigorate ‘civil society’ in order to address information 
asymmetries only selectively supported. 
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‘Institutions, broadly defined to include governments, private organisations, laws, and 
social norms, contribute to establishing recognised standards and enforcing contracts, 
thus making possible transactions that would otherwise not occur. Rich countries have 
more-diverse and more-effective institutions to address information problems than do 
poor countries’. Elsewhere the Bank signalled an expansive reform agenda towards 
closing this institutional gap: ‘Greater information and transparency are vital for 
informed public debate and form increasing popular trust and confidence in the state – 
whether in discussing expenditure priorities, designing social assistance programs, or 
managing forests and other resources’ (World Bank 1997: 10). This alluded to notions 
of ‘empowerment’ and ‘voice’, the elements of the PWC that Summers, O’Neill and 
other neoliberals were not entirely comfortable with.  
The World Development Report 2002, Building Institutions for Markets 
(2002), was to subsequently elaborate on the content and theoretical rationale of 
institution building to address information problems. This included the role of the 
media in providing information immediately useful for economic markets and the 
importance of reforms to ensure adequate access to public information enabling 
journalists to investigate issues and disseminate reports. However, the Report drew 
heavily on North’s new institutionalist theory, including in the arguments for a free 
press. According to the Report, the ‘media can play an important role in development 
by affecting the incentives of market participants – businesses, individuals, or 
politicians – and by influencing demand for institutional change’ (World Bank 2002: 
192-3). It further observed that media ‘provide information on political markets, 
exposing corrupt and unethical politicians’ and play a role in ‘giving people a 
platform to voice diverse opinions on governance and reform’ (World Bank 2002: 
181).
4 Crucially, though, through free media: ‘Better information makes monitoring 
peoples’ [sic] behaviour easier’ (World Bank 2002: 18). According to the Bank, ‘the 
ability to monitor behaviour changes behaviour’ (World Bank 2002: 18). The Bank 
was both aligning with North’s theory on institutions as generators of interests and 
constituencies, as well as with the idea that information makes for efficient 
surveillance necessary to enforce market rules. The Bank was thus influenced by the 
two main branches of new institutional economics (Bardhan 1989). 
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centre of development strategies, appreciation of institutions of transparency to 
improve market discipline and embed market values through surveillance is universal. 
Thus, despite other differences with the Bank, Summers (2001) echoed the Bank’s 
sentiment when he observed that: ‘Transparency is good because, as someone once 
said, “conscience is the knowledge that someone’s watching”’. However, the 
neoliberal reform push for transparency has so far been weighted very heavily in 
favour of the most obviously market-instrumental forms of financial transparency. 
Other institutions fostering general political openness and accountability such as a 
free press, freedom of information acts, mandatory public records of the interests of 
members of parliament and senior public servants, or the repeal of official secrets acts 
and other parliamentary acts limiting public access to official information have not 
featured anywhere near as prominently.  
Certainly in East and Southeast Asia, by far the greatest progress in the PWC 
transparency agenda has involved improved information reporting by governments 
and regulatory authorities. The IMF has been at the fore of these developments, 
applying pressure for more transparent budget and monetary policy statements by 
governments, and the adoption of internationally agreed standards in accounting, 
disclosure and bankruptcy codes within the corporate sector. This information has 
been elicited through the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), the Code of 
Good Practices in Monetary and Financial Policies, and the Code of Good Practices 
on Fiscal Transparency. The purpose of these regimes has been no secret. In 1997, 
IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus (1997a), asserted that: ‘Greater 
transparency will help strengthen market discipline and avoid market surprises that 
can lead to disruptive market reactions’. He subsequently elaborated: ‘In order for 
surveillance to be effective, however, data provision needs to be timely, accurate, and 
comprehensive. Thus, the IMF has decided to be more demanding about the coverage 
and quality of the data provided to us and communicated to the markets’ (Camdessus 
1998).
5 Importantly, though, as Johnson (2001) points out, IMF efforts to improve 
information disclosures have excluded disclosures about the actual decision-making 
process that might enable non-economic actors to question economic policy, or exert 
any more influence over it.   
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neoliberals there isn’t really a consensus on the actual detail of the transparency 
reform agenda. The narrow reforms that have been implemented represent common 
ground. The adoption of these international standards is of course meant to foster 
financial liberalisation in the developing world – a top priority among neoliberals in 
general – and through the IFIs in particular there are viable mechanisms to pursue 
such reforms (Soederberg 2002: 615). Moreover, within the IMF, there were 
particular reasons to concentrate attention on information transparency. The 
proposition that information shortfalls were responsible for the Asian financial crisis 
conveniently deflected focus from the question of whether IMF policies or financial 
liberalisation itself was problematic.  
While many investors have welcomed the better macroeconomic and other 
data stemming from the IMF’s transparency reform drive, the assumption that 
investors were completely in the dark about the extent of corruption or the economic 
fundamentals in East and Southeast prior to the 1997 financial crisis doesn’t hold up 
to close scrutiny. Indeed, the absence of transparency in Asia was in many instances 
part of the attraction to investors since the increased risk of investment also brought 
potentially higher returns (see Rodan 2004a). But focus on transparency did more than 
deflect attention to internal governance deficiencies in the crisis post mortem; it 
offered a political means through which ‘crony capitalists’ and other obstacles to free 
markets – including ‘developmental states – could potentially be constrained. The 
linking of transparency shortfalls with ‘crony capitalism’ was thematic in IMF 
assessments of, and prescriptions on, the Asian crisis. The IMF’s Managing Director, 
Michel Camdessus (1999), talked about transparency as the ‘golden rule’ of the new 
international financial system and described it as ‘absolutely central to the task of 
civilising globalization’. However, the IMF’s aim of ‘civilizing globalization’ clearly 
had ‘crony capitalism’ principally in its sights: 
A lack of transparency has been found at the origins of the recurring crises in 
the emerging markets, and it has been a pernicious feature of the ‘crony 
capitalism’ that has plagued most of the crisis countries and many more 
besides. More positively, the very first principles of the market economy tell 
us that open, competitive markets function only where transparency exists 
(Camdessus 1999). 
The sorts of transparency that the IMF was concerned about institutionalising – 
information on foreign reserves, information on off-balance sheet transactions of 
  15central banks, about banking systems more generally – were as important in limiting 
the discretionary powers of policymakers and bureaucrats as they were in the intrinsic 
information they provided investors.
6
 
GOVERNANCE OR TRANSPARENCY? COMPARING MALAYSIA AND 
SINGAPORE 
This above point helps explain quite different assessments of, and reactions to, 
transparency reforms in Singapore and Malaysia by neoliberal transparency 
ideologues and forces of neoliberal globalisation. Following the advent of the Asian 
financial crisis, governments in both these countries embraced the rhetoric of 
transparency and embarked on similar sets of reforms to impress international finance 
capital in particular. By any measure of transparency – whether in terms of 
macroeconomic data, banking or corporate disclosures more generally, or in terms of 
political transparency such as media freedom or declarations of interests by public 
officials – the transparency regimes in these countries and the actual availability and 
quality of information were virtually indistinguishable and poor. However, in the 
international business media and in the patterns of international investment in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Malaysia was treated quite differently and came in for a great 
deal more criticism for its lack of transparency (Rodan 2004a).  
The reason for this was the extent and nature of crony capitalism and 
associated corruption in Malaysia. This not only produced periodic bailouts of local 
tycoons and assorted favours to well-connected market players, it generally affected 
the predictability and reliability of regulatory and supervisory regimes presiding over 
the market economy. The climate of the Asian crisis and fears of rising economic 
nationalism intensified reliance on governance reforms to secure the conditions for 
continued market liberalisation and access of international capital to domestic 
markets. Increased transparency in the form of improved regulatory and corporate 
accountability and disclosure had the political attraction of exposing, and hopefully 
limiting, the effect of state-business power relations on the market.  
To be sure, in Singapore institutional power has been exercised to protect and 
advance the interests of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and indeed the PAP 
state. The relationships between government-linked-companies, regulatory authorities 
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the ruling party certainly raise questions of conflict of interest and how level the 
playing field is for market participants (Tan 2002). Nevertheless, perceptions of 
Singapore by investors and analysts have been mediated by capital’s experiences of 
bureaucratic efficiency and the predictability and reliability of governance regimes 
when compared with the rest of Southeast Asia. By contrast, in the immediate years 
following the Asian crisis, journalists, professional financial and economic analysts 
and investors were concerned that the enmeshing of state and private sector interests 
in Malaysia necessitated a much greater degree of regulatory constraint. Furthermore, 
with the advent of the Asian crisis, the Singapore government increased competition 
in the banking sector and accelerated its WTO commitments to liberalise the 
telecommunications sector. This was in sharp contrast with threats on economic 
nationalism in other parts of the region. There was thus far greater anxiety about 
shortfalls in transparency within Malaysia where crony capitalism was a less reliable 
and predictable framework for the neoliberal agenda of trade and investment 
liberalisation (Rodan 2004a).  
Indeed, while Malaysia was being criticised for its lack of transparency, 
Singapore was able to enhance its governance reputation through various international 
surveys and studies. In 2001, for example, the professional services company 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) surveyed chief financial officers, equity analysts, 
bankers and PwC consultants on 35 different countries, out of which it developed an 
Opacity Index. Opacity was defined as ‘the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily 
discernible and widely accepted practices  (my emphasis)’. This covered the five 
factors of corruption, the legal system, government macroeconomic and fiscal policy, 
accounting standards and practices, and the regulatory regime. Significantly, this 
concept of opacity went beyond issues of information availability and disclosure to 
those of reliability and credibility of public policy and its implementation. 
Respondents were surveyed about the extent to which there were ‘clearly established 
rules for changing and/or consistently applying regulatory rules and procedures’ 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001: 8). Singapore topped the ranking on the categories of 
corruption and regulatory opacity. No less significantly, this and most other such 
surveys paid little or no attention to aspects of political transparency such as media 
freedom, where there has been no reform at all. 
  17This is not to claim that Singapore has entirely avoided criticism or scrutiny in 
the new neoliberal transparency drive, for more recently there has been selective 
critical attention through the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
(USSFTA). Here the concept of transparency has been harnessed in specific, selective 
challenges to the developmental state in an attempt to reduce the competitive 
advantages derived by GLCs from existing governance arrangements; the aim being 
to prise open more domestic market access for international capital, in the banking 
and telecommunications sectors in particular.  
Largely due to the efforts of a U.S. lobby group called the Coalition of Service 
Industries (CSI), considerable energy was devoted during the negotiations towards 
achieving more transparent regulatory and licensing regimes in Singapore. Eventually, 
the agreement incorporated a range of commitments to enhance the transparency and 
independence of decisions by regulatory authorities, including the establishment of an 
independent dispute-settlement body for the telecommunications sector.
7 The 
Singapore government has also committed to providing annual information to the 
United States on Singapore government enterprises with substantial revenues or 
assets. This pressure from the U.S. is meant to elicit details on how GLCs are run, by 
whom and what ownership levels and structures are involved. Such provisions are 
clearly directed at Singapore’s powerful statutory bodies and Singapore Technologies, 
which is not a publicly listed company and therefore bypasses disclosure requirements 
of the Singapore Stock Exchange (Rodan 2004b).  
How significant these new forms of transparency prove to be in checking the 
market power of GLCs in the domestic economy remains to be seen. The likelihood is 
that the overall integrity of the developmental state will not be seriously threatened by 
the contents of this agreement. The ascendancy of the GLCs within the domestic 
economy is deeply rooted and will not be easily eroded. However, to the extent that 
any market access is improved for U.S.-based capital then transparency provisions 
will have been useful for the concrete interests aligned to the CSI.   
This highlights something that North’s theory about institutions generating 
constituencies overlooks – that for these to take root in the first place, there need to be 
social forces with sufficient interest and capacity to make this happen (Chaudrhy 
1994). Political pressure and support from business communities for broad 
transparency reforms that extend to a free press and political openness has been 
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advanced.  
In the USSFTA, for instance, the Americans didn’t push for an opening up of 
the domestic media. Evidently there were neither commercial nor any other interests 
sufficiently organised or interested in such liberalisation. Nor did media reform 
feature in the reforms associated with China’s entry into the WTO.
8 Civil society 
groups working towards political transparency objectives have generally been unable 
to build effective enough coalitions to pressure authoritarian regimes on these issues. 
The experience of the Malaysian chapter of worldwide NGO Transparency 
International – the Kuala Lumpur Society for Transparency & Integrity – provides 
further illustration of this point. Attempts to get members of the Malaysian 
International Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) involved in the 
organisation have been totally ineffective, despite the ability to attract support from a 
wide range of human and consumer rights groups (Rodan 2004a). 
 
HARNESSING TRANSPARENCY TO AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
What the discussion immediately above suggests is that the harnessing of forms of 
transparency to the attack on crony capitalism and developmental states is essentially 
one of institutionalising Weberian rationalist values and technocratic values, not 
liberal democratic values. This attack is often a pragmatic one too, with the forces 
behind the neoliberal agenda not so much wedded to principles of Weberian 
rationalism, technocracy or even transparency, as keen to exploit their utility for 
improving market access. Importantly, those forces may be only partially or 
periodically attracted to the vision of neoliberal ideologues. Consequently, to differing 
degrees, these reform pressures can be accommodated by authoritarian regimes. 
Moreover, as we will see below in a brief examination of the Singapore experience, 
the rhetoric of transparency can be capitalised on by authoritarian regimes to both 
shore up international governance credibility and to deflect and suppress political 
contestation. 
At the outset of the heightened international emphasis on the need for 
improved transparency in Asia in response to the financial crisis, the Singapore 
government got on the rhetorical offensive. It understood the importance of being 
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Singapore system of governance from those in neighbouring countries, the then 
Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, asserted: ‘Because we are what we are, open and 
transparent, investors have confidence in us. The investors assess the situation and 
say, yes, this is a government and system that will tick in an honest and efficient way’ 
(quoted in Straits Times 1999). Here Lee was conflating transparency with other 
governance factors important to international business of the sort that scored highly in 
the PricewaterhouseCoopers study discussed above. Yet the government also set 
about implementing a range of reforms to bolster the claim. This was, however, a 
programme with two characteristics. First, it exclusively involved forms of financial 
and economic transparency that raised levels of disclosure and accountability to the 
market.
9 Significantly, though, few of these reforms have had any impact on the 
operations of GLCs, except those that happen to be listed companies. Second, the 
government cleverly exploited and co-opted the concept of transparency to the 
reproduction of the political regime.  
In conjunction with the Singapore government’s narrow reform programme, 
the government-controlled daily newspaper The Business Times has also played a role 
in promoting this sort of transparency. In 2000, it launched a Corporate Transparency 
Index (CTI), with weekly assessments of companies. The stated objective of the CTI 
was to ‘assess, from shareholders’ standpoint, several aspects – content, usefulness, 
timeliness and means of dissemination – of financial information disclosed by all 
companies on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX)’ (Thompson 2000). Through this 
index, some listed GLCs were able to score well and help project an image of 
improving openness among them. Meanwhile, the core institutions of state economic 
secrecy, such as the Singapore Government Investment Corporation (GIC) and state 
holding company, Temasek Holdings, carried on in opaque fashion. The government 
has been much happier to enforce increased financial transparency and accountability 
on the private sector than on the state’s economic and political interests. 
Attempts by the government’s domestic critics to widen the transparency 
reform agenda have been stoutly resisted by the government, in part by drawing on 
international surveys and indices of governance performance favourable to the 
government. In 1999, Singapore’s two most combative oppositionists, J.B. 
Jeyaretnam and Chee Soon Juan, established the Open Singapore Centre (OSC) on the 
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private sector, will not come about unless we have an open society with accurate and 
verifiable information available to the citizens at all times’. The official response to 
the OSC initiative, however, was dismissive. Following a request from Jeyaretnam for 
a government grant to support OSC activities, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, Tan Tee How (1999), wrote in reply that: ‘There is no need for your Open 
Singapore Centre. Singapore is already widely recognised as an open society which 
practices transparency and democratic accountability’. Tan cited rankings in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and surveys by Political 
and Economic Risk Consultancy on corruption to support his claim – neither of which 
are actually measures of transparency. Far from adding pressure on the regime for 
political transparency, the CPI in particular is regularly used to discredit arguments 
for such reform.  
  Ironically, it is the PAP rather than its critics that has thus far proven 
more adept in exploiting the discourse of transparency for political ends. A Political 
Donations Act came into effect in February 2001 requiring public record of donors 
giving more than S$10,000 in a financial year to any political party or association and 
restricting the total of anonymous donations to S$5,000. In itself, this constitutes 
improved political transparency that is difficult to argue with (Koh 2001). However, 
in a context where fear of political persecution is high, the legislation represents 
additional intimidation that could hinder the opposition’s already meagre fund raising 
capacity, and that of politically oriented associations. The Act also bars political 
parties and associations from receiving funding from non-Singaporeans or foreign 
companies, which cuts off access to funding from liberal international NGOs that 
have supported various liberal and democratic movements in the region that also 
struggle for resources. It may be no coincidence that the government declared its new 
bill just a matter of weeks after the Open Singapore Society had secured a small 
amount of funding from outside Singapore. 
The Registry of Political Donations announced in March 2001 that two non-
party-political organisations registered with the Registry of Companies and 
Businesses – the OSC and the Think Centre – would be considered political 
associations and subject to the Act. Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng cited 
OSC calls for a referendum on changes to the electoral process and protests against 
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these organisations foil their attempt to circumvent the Societies Act which limits 
political engagement to formally registered political societies, now they were under 
pressure to publicly divulge whatever limited sources of income they had. In the 
process, the PAP drew a contrast between itself as a party that had no foreign backers 
with its critics who apparently did but were reluctant to reveal details. Wong taunted 
J.B. Jeyaretman, one of the co-founders, telling reporters: ‘You should ask Mr 
Jeyaretnam, if he promotes openness and transparency, where did he get the foreign 
money, why is he afraid to tell Singaporeans?’ (quoted in Vasoo 2001a). In a clever 
turning of the tables, the OSC’s calls for all ministers to declare their incomes and 
assets and for the Government Investment Corporation to open its books became lost 
in a sea of accusations that had the OSC on the defensive (Vasoo 2001b).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of transparency is a powerful one, evoking generally positive 
connotations and having an appeal well beyond neoliberalism. This is precisely why it 
is important to be clear about the meaning and impact of neoliberal conceptions of the 
concept. The danger of neoliberal transparency becoming popularly conflated with 
political openness or even democracy is especially important to guard against. With 
initiatives like the Millennium Challenge Account that could give significant power to 
neoliberal NGOs to evaluate progress towards transparent and democratic institutions 
as a basis for U.S. aid funding, this is a serious issue. As we have seen above, the 
primacy accorded by neoliberals to private property relations and those institutions 
that uphold these makes certain authoritarian political regimes potentially acceptable. 
Institutions of transparency that foster open markets or embed market values could 
therefore make very favourable impressions, regardless of the political regime. 
Crucially, what we have seen above is that the neoliberal objective of broadly 
institutionalising the values of the market is an inherently political agenda, but one 
that is often concealed as such by the seemingly technical processes and ideas through 
which it is advanced. This is especially true of the neoliberal transparency drive, 
which is being pursued in two fundamental ways. 
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transgressions from market liberalism. This is a necessary foundation for effective 
disciplining of public and private policymakers and bureaucrats to the primacy of 
market rules. For those in the neoliberal camp who differentiate little between 
economic and political liberty, transparency is also especially important for insulating 
some of the decisions in support of those rules from scrutiny and challenges by 
collective, organised political actors.  
The second is by promoting and embedding the ideological notion that the 
value of transparency is to be measured – whether directly or indirectly – by its 
market utility. This ideology is shared across the neoliberal spectrum and means that 
even among those neoliberals who champion notions of ‘voice’ and ‘political 
participation’. It promotes an internalisation of market relationships as natural and 
beyond contest by keeping the focus on how to make the market system function 
better. Consequently, the range of interests and issues represented in the political 
process is limited by this ideology. Attention is deflected from the substantive 
outcomes of markets – such as social inequalities – and the issues and conflicts 
generated by them. 
There are differences among neoliberals, with some positing an important role 
for formal political and civil society institutions in the transparency reform agenda. 
However, such ideas have exerted far less impact than the more immediately 
instrumental forms of transparency, such as financial transparency. This is because 
there have been concrete interests – or constellations of interests – effectively pushing 
and supporting the latter such reforms. As we saw in the Singapore case, this has not 
just involved elements of international capital but also state interests. By contrast, 
effective coalitions to push for political transparency have been harder to forge, not 
least because of international capital’s indifference to such agendas.  
  The neoliberal transparency that has generally prevailed in Asia after 
the financial crisis does not foster democratic governance. Rather, for the most part it 
seeks to have Weberian and technocratic systems of governance institutionalised to 
secure the conditions for increased and more sustainable capital mobility. Here there 
is an attempt to enforce some forms of institutional convergence with established 
practices in advanced capitalist market systems. The pressure is towards bureaucratic 
rationalist and technocratic practices and values. For this reason, neoliberal 
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and may even be selectively engaged with by such regimes to both satisfy capital and 
help shore up regime legitimacy or reproduction. 
Transparency reform, like the wider institutional reforms to which it relates, is 
presented by neoliberals as removing special interests from governance. However, the 
reform agenda is not about the removal of politics from public administration, but the 
establishment of a new politics that attempts to contain challenges to market 
relationships and privileges the interests associated with those relationships.  
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NOTES 
 
1 One dimension that Jayasuriya (2001) gives particular attention to is the way that the neoliberal 
promotion of independent central banks in Asia. The increasing importance of monetary policy to 
global financial integration obviously explains this neoliberal drive, but he points out that it entails a 
transfer of power within the state in favour of central banks, which enjoy a degree of political 
autonomy that governmental agencies don’t.  
2 Co-editor of the 2004 Index of Economic Freedom, Mary O’Grady (2004), for example, asserts that: 
‘Secure property rights help explain why Hong Kong and Singapore enjoy annual per capita incomes of 
better that $24,000 while Zimbabwe, where property rights have been trampled, has an annual per 
capita income of $559’. 
3 This is not to say that the domestic business classes have not encountered problems with property 
rights, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s when massive state-managed housing and commercial 
redevelopments occurred.  
4 These themes were amplified on in the related Bank publication The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass 
Media in Economic Development (World Bank Institute 2002). The World Bank Institute also operates 
programmes for the training of journalists, with special emphasis on investigative and economic 
journalism. 
5 Camdessus (1997b) also explained that: ‘Our approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good 
governance that are most closely related to our surveillance over macroeconomic policies – namely, the 
transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management, and the 
stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private sector activity’.  
6 Germaine (2004:226) points out that both central banks and regulatory agencies responsible for 
financial governance are increasingly becoming legally independent of central government, thereby 
‘complicating lines of accountability’.  
7 A clause stating that ‘Regulatory authorities must use open and transparent administrative procedures, 
consult with interested parties before issuing regulations, provide advance notice and comment periods 
for proposed rules, and publish all regulations’ was included in the agreement too (U.S. State 
Department 2002). 
8 Incidentally, U.S. negotiators involved in the Chinese accession to the WTO were criticised by 
Barfield and Groombridge (1999) for surrendering an opportunity to ‘force the Chinese to introduce 
greater transparency in their commercial laws and administrative procedures as they affect foreign 
businesses and investors’. They asserted that: ‘Given the primitive state of Chinese law and 
administrative procedures, foreign businesses face years of daunting obstacles when commercial 
disputes arise’. 
9 The reforms include: a string of changes arising from the Report on Banking Disclosure to require 
more information from banks about undisclosed reserves, accounting practices, balance sheets and 
financial review; amendments to the Companies Bill to impose stricter codes of conduct and to require 
more timely, accurate and detailed disclosures by companies; changes arising from the report of the 
Corporate Governance Committee concerning disclosures of directors, about the process of boards of 
directors, about directors’ remuneration, auditing procedures and communications with shareholders; 
changes prescribed by the Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee, including the adoption of 
quarterly results reporting, and the adoption of standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board; changes introduced by the Monetary Authority of Singapore to increase the amount 
of information required of issuers of stocks, debt securities and funds. 
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